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Development?

WEBER

Universityof Louisville
In the world of Church-State scholarship writers are usually
grouped into opposing camps called Absolute Separationists and Accommodationists. Both groups attempt to interpret the First Amendment religion clauses but draw radically different conclusions about
what the First Amendment requires of us today. Those who espouse
other positions are either ignored or, worse yet, accused of being closet
separationists or accommodationists (depending on the perspective of
the accuser) . Yet there is another position gaining ground . In the 25
years since the concept of strict neutrality emerged success has come
almost inadvertently. 1 The Supreme Court, without adopting the concept of strict neutrality has begun to use the terminology of neutrality
on occasion, and the major casebook in the field has the intriguing title,
Toward BenevolentNeutrality, a term the authors conveniently leave
undefined. 2 Unfortunately the term "neutrality" has almost as many
meanings as the more generalized concept "separation."
To understand the strict neutralist position it is helpful to begin with
two presuppositions. (a) When the Founders wrote the First Amendment they did not write with either the clairvoyance or the specificity
that would make it easy to apply their principles to problems arising in
contemporary church-state relations. There are various strands in the
Founders thought which allow not only for conflicting interpretations
but for contemporary adaptation. (b) We live almost two hundred
years since the First Amendment Religion Clauses were penned and
enormous changes have taken place, changes far beyond what the
Founders could have imagined.
Granted these presuppositions, the challenge in constitutional
theorizing is to create a principle of interpretation which (1) remains
as faithful as possible to the language of the Constitution and the intent
of the Founders, (2) is realistic , i.e., acknowledges political and
economic reality and which (3) resolves problems in a manner seen as
just, fair and required by the constitution. Before undertaking that
challenge, further reflection on the presuppositions may be helpful.

Varieties of Separation
The term "separation of church and state " although never appearing in the constitution , has become so enbedded in American consciousness that it seems to sum up what is meant by the First Amendment religion clauses . Small wonder . The term is so broad it can
embrace a wide variety of beliefs and practices, and allows groups
espousing any one of several policy agendas to wrap themselves in the
mantle of the Constitution . Our first task is to sort out the divergent
meanings of the term "separation" and determine which best meet the
challenges of constitutional theorizing.
Separation, in the First Amendment context , is a generic term
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which has at least five distinct meanings. 3 The most fundamental is

structural separation,and distinguishes most Western systems from
such organic systems as exist in Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim
countries. The characteristics of structural separation are independent
clerical and civil offices, separate organizations for government and
religions, different personnel performing different functions, separate
systems of law and independent ownership of property and the absence
of any officially designated church or religion. Jefferson, Madison and
most of the other Founders accepted the need for structural separation, and where they found remnants of organic relationships, as in
parts of common law, they worked to remove them. It may be that this
is as far as their thought had progressed at the time, although there are
clues that they wanted something more.
Absolute separationis a type vigorously pursued by some interest
groups in this country. It is more of a financial separation than
anything else, holding that no aid of any kind should flow from government to religion or churches, and no financial support should flow from
religion or churches to the government. Absolutists would take as normative Justice Black's description of the Establishment clause in Ever-

son v Board of Education.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the first
amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church
and State." 4
The difficulties facing the advocates of absolute separation are
twofold. First, it is by no means clear that the Founders intended this
specific a meaning of separation. 5 Second, historical practice in the
United States, including contemporary practice, has included enormous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flowing to religion from
government in return for enormous amounts of mostly indirect aid
from religion. 6 This is a political and economic reality absolutists may
rally against, but it is so imbedded in law and practice that it is unlikely
to change in the forseeable future. Absolutists are left in the awkward
position of claiming as constitutional principle-a law to be
obeyed-something that has never existed and is never likely to. Ab71

solute separation is an ideal, not a reality. Unfortunately for absolutists, the Constitution, unlike the Declaration of Independence, has
the force of law and is meant to be obeyed as well as admired.
Transvaluing separationis less understood in the United States,
but does have a devoted following. It holds that one objective of
government is to secularize the political culture of the nation, that is, to
reject as politically illegitimate the use of all religious symbols, or the
appeal to religious values, motivations or policy objectives in the
political arena. Transvaluing separation would deny all aid to religious
organizations under any circumstances. It is this type of separation
that is touted in the Soviet constitution and law. 7 One statement from
an American group that seems best to express this position is that of
the American Humanist Association:
To promote the "general welfare," a particular
measure may be favored by church interests, and consequently pressure and influence are brought to bear
on the state's political machinery to assure its passage .
Or a measure may be viewed with disfavor by the
church with a resultant pressure on the state's political
machinery to assure its defeat. This type of activity by
the church harks back to pre-Revolutionary days both
here and in Europe, where there was "cooperation"
between government and church. But it was just that
sort of religion-political interplay that the Founding
Fathers tried desperately to prevent on American soil
by adopting the First Amendment and the corresponding state laws. 8
Thomas Jefferson's desire to provide access to the University of
Virginia for neighboring schools of divinity is prima facie evidence that
he did not favor this type of separation. I have argued elsewhere that
Madison 's Memorial and Remonstrance shows his opposition to this
type separation. 9 In any event , the Supreme Court has never accepted
transvaluing separation and it does not appear to have much promise
as a constitutional principle in the United States.
What has traditionally been called " accommodation" I would call
Supportive Separation. Those who hold this position acknowledge the
need for structural separation but would not drive the principle to the
extremes of the absolute or transvaluing types . To the contrary , supportive separationists favor aid and support for religion, holding only
that government may not support one religion over another. This position takes as normative Justice William 0 . Douglas' dictum that
We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the
freedom to worship as one chooses . We make room for
as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual
needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude
on the part of government that shows no partiality to
any one group and that lets each flourish according to
the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
When the state encourages religious instruction and
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
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schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For it then respects the
religious nature of our people and accommodates the
public service to their spiritual needs. 10
Unfortunately for advocates of supportive separation the history
of the battle for religious liberty in Virginia and of the framing of the
First Amendment undermines any claim that this is what the Founders
intended. In addition, a whole series of decisions indicates very clearly
that the Supreme Court does not believe this is what the Constitution
requires. Finally, there has been strong political opposition to such a
position throughout American history.
Equal Separationis that type which rejects all political or economic
privilege, coercion or disability based on religious affiliation, belief or
practice, or lack thereof, but guarantees to religiously motivated or affiliated individuals and organizations the same rights and privileges extended to other similarly situated individuals and organizations. It provides protection to religion without providing privilege. It treats the
right to religious belief and practice as a human right to be protected
along with other human rights in an evenhanded manner. It protects
the right of religiously motivated groups and individuals to participate
in the political process and the economic system in the same manner
and to the same extent as it protects the rights of other similar groups
and individuals to participate.
A difficulty facing proponents of equal separation is that it is a concept only recently developed and therefore unfamiliar to most
Americans. It has been viewed suspiciously by advocates of other
types of separation who fear that it will lead to a decrease in protection
for religious liberty or an increase in aid to religion. Nonetheless it is
the basis for the strict neutrality approach to the religion clauses and
will be further developed below. It has been argued that equal separation is most consistent with the thought of James Madison. 11

Historical Developments
Several developments of enormous proportions have made it impossible to apply the First Amendment religion clauses to contemporary problems in any simplistic fashion and still meet the requirements for constitutional theorizing posited above. 12 Due to space
limitations these will simply be listed. The first development is the application of the religion clauses to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court. This is
not something the Founders foresaw.
A second unforeseen development is the transformation of both
federal and state governments from passive-protective, minimalist
governments
to active-expansive,
pervasive administrative
bureaucracies. This change from a laissez-faire to a bureaucratic state
with broad taxing, regulatory and spending powers has enormous implications for church-state relations.
Parallel to the expansion of government has been the expansion of
religious organizations in population, physical institutions, activities
undertaken and sheer variety of denominations, sects and cults.
A fourth major change is the invention of technologies which make
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possible such new activities as mass education, mass communication,
massive impersonal solicitation of funds, the fabrication of mind altering drugs , and in the very near future , genetic manipulation .
Finally , the sheer growth in population density, mobility and diversity has profoundly altered the environment within which religious
organizations and activities exist and the laws affecting them are
made. Density and mobility are significant because it is no longer easy
for individuals to live solely among their own kind or shelter their
children from exposure to competing values.
Taken together, these five developments since the First Amendment was written pose such difficulties in terms of potential conflict,
discrimination and entanglement that legal theories which ignore them
are doomed to failure . The task of the original Founders was to protect
religious liberty from government. The contemporary task is to protect
religious liberty in the midst of government. The same is true for
preventing establishment while not discriminating against religion.

The Theory of Strict Neutrality
Strict Neutrality was proposed a quarter century ago by Professor
Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago:
The thesis proposed here as the proper construction of the religion clauses of the first amendment is
that the freedom and separation clauses should be
read as a single precept that govenment cannot utilize
religion as a standard for action or inaction because
these clauses prohibit classification in terms of
religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden. 13
The thesis has been developed since then and some clarifications
may be helpful. First, the purposes of the religion clauses can be
summed up as freedom, separation , and equality . The application of
the clauses in conjunction is both possible and necessary. It can be
done by reading the clauses as an equal protection doctrine , or as
Kurland explains:
For if the command is that inhibitions not be placed
by the state on religious activity, it is equally forbidden
the state to confer favors upon religious activity.
These commands would be impossible of effectuation
unless they are read together as creating a doctrine
more akin to the reading of the equal protection clause
than to the due process clause , i.e. , they must be read
to mean that religion may not be used as a basis for
classification for purposes of government action,
whether that action be the conferring of rights or
privileges or the imposition of duties or obligations. 14
The equal protection doctrine is a well developed component of
constitutional law and can provide a firm foundation of dealing with
current controversies in the church-state area, providing both consistency and flexibility. Acceptance of strict neutrality is not a denial
that religion can be used as a classification to identify a significant personal interest or social unit. It would be incongruous to hold that the
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Constitution could recognize the existence of religion but that the
government based on that Constitution could not. Recognition of an
objective fact of personal value preference or of social organization
would not be a violation of the neutrality principle. Examples might be
recognition of the presence of a church or synagogue when planning
traffic control signals or assigning personnel to expedite traffic. Such
recognition implies that in relevant secular aspects individual religious
interests and social groups are similar to other interests and groups,
not based on religious content, but on the other public and secular
aspects of a religion's social organization. Put in other words, strict
neutrality is committed to the proposition that there is seldom a legally
significant characteristic of religion so unique that it is not shared by
similar nonreligious individuals and groups. The conclusion to be
drawn is that in most aspects, religious individuals and interests are
subject to the same laws as other similarly situated individuals and
groups.
But what happens when there is a claim based on a uniquely
religious belief, e.g., when as Adventist cannot work on Saturday and
requests unemployment compensation? Or a Mennonite refuses to
have her picture on a driver's license? Or a Baptist church requires all
its employees to be members of the church? Or what happens when a
purportedly neutral law in fact imposes a significant burden on a
religion or even prohibits a religious activity, e.g., an ordiance that prohibits door to door solicitation on weekends? In such cases religion may
be treated as a suspect classificationsubject to strict scrutiny by the
courts. A suspect classification is one in which there is "a presumption
of unconstitutionality against a law implying certain classifying
traits." 15 If religion is considered a suspect classification, any statute
utilizing religion or specifically impacting on religion is automatically
suspect, will demand a very heavy burden of justification, and will be
subject to the most rigid scrutiny. More than just a rational connection
to a legitimate public purpose will be required. Nevertheless, if the
standards of proof are met, the religious interest will be protected.
The suspect classification concept is used most frequently to prohibit racial and sexual discrimination, but it can equally well be used to
preserve government neutrality in respect to religion. The question immediately arises: what are the principles that justify such a classification and define its limits? Professor Donald Giannella several years ago
offered two such principles. The first is the principle of free exercise
neutrality that "permits and sometimes requires the state to make
special provision for religious interests in order to relieve them of both
direct and indirect burdens placed on the free exercise of religion by increased governmental regulation." 16 Such a provision is consonant
with the "protected civil right" nature of religious liberty, but in
accordance with the general neutralist position such provisions must
be extended to other similar groups if there are any.
The second principle is that of political neutrality. Its aim is "to
assure that the establishment clause does not force the categorical exclusion of religious activities and associations from a scheme of governmental regulations whose secular purposes justify their inclusion. " 17
Several examples might clarify the concept: If a local government is
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distributing excess cheese and bread to the poor through neighborhood
organizations, church groups could be neither given exclusive rights to
distribute the foodstuffs nor excluded from doing so. If government
rents neighborhood buildings as polling places, churches could be
neither preferred nor excluded from participation. Obviously equal access legislation fits within the strict neutrality concept . At the same
time , if a church does participate in secular programs, under the
neutrality principle it would have to keep the same records and maintain the same standards as other participants.

Objections to the Strict Neutrality Principle
A number of objections have been raised to the neutrality principle
and we now turn to them. First is the objection that strict neutrality
" guts " the religion clauses of any substantive meaning ; this objection
argues that if religious groups , indi'viduals and interests are to be
treated equally with others then the religion clauses are
irrelevant-surely not a situation the Founders intended .
It is true that very much of religious activity and all of religious
thought are fully protected in the speech, press, and assembly clauses
of the First Amendment, as well as by the due process and equal protection clauses, etc. Double protection serves no additional function .
Unlike the speech, press and assembly clauses, however, the religion
clauses are twofold , prohibiting the establishment of religion as well as
guaranteeing its free exercise. The recognition of an independent liberty
must be such that it offends neither one nor the other . Classification in
terms of religion may tend to discriminate either by favoring religious
interests at the expense of other similarly situated interests or by
burdening religious interests in such a way as to have a "chilling
effect " on religious liberty. The most equitable solution to this dilemma
is to treat religipus groups and interests like similar groups and interests . For example, a religious group seeking funds for its projects
would have to conform to the same fundraising rules and accounting
standards as other nonprofit groups.
Precisely because religious liberty is an independent, substantive
right, it functions as an indicator of the need to protect other groups
and limit government intrusion into their affairs as well as into its own.
Religious liberty is a protected legal right , but not a uniquely privileged
one, that is, it gives no rights on the basis of religious commitment that
do not extend equally to similar interests. In that sense it is a qualified
legal right-qualified by the Establishment clause.
A second objection holds that strict neutrality will limit religious
liberty, that is, religious groups will be required to live under the same
government regulations , abide by such things as affirmative action
goals, file informational tax returns , etc . in the same manner as other
not-for-profit organizations. That objection is partially valid, and
designedly so. There is a cost to be borne for living in an organized
society and while that cost is not borne equally under the neutrality
principle , churches and other religious groups ought to be paying the
same price and sharing the same burdens as other similar groups . If
they do not , they are in a uniquely privileged position which is not
something the Founders intended and which is a major objective of the
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Establishment clause to avoid. Does this mean churches would have to
pay truces under this principle? No, so long as other not-for-profit
groups do not.
There is another side to this. Bureaucracies can be burdensome;
regulations can be unreasonable. Religious groups may often find
themselves resisting government intrusions, opposing new regulations
or reporting requirements, etc. Their input into the policy process is
useful and healthy; churches can act as a brake on unnecessary government expansion and protect not only religious interests but the interests of others in society as well. Strict neutrality does not limit
religious liberty; it only removes religious privilege.
A third objection is that strict neutrality is only a smokescreen
behind which to usher in massive aid to religious schools at the expense
of the public schools. Several considerations are relevant. Religious
schools seeking funds would need to conform to the same hiring, certification, accrediting, admissions and attendance standards, the same
curriculum and textbook requirements and submit to inspections and
oversight at the same level as other publically funded schools. This is
not at all the Religious Right agenda or that of the parocial schools. 18
Under such conditions there is unlikely to be a rush for funding. The
real advantage, if there is one in this area, is to stimulate competition
and innovation in education by groups willing to accept government
regulations, a competition many public schools desperately need.
A fourth objection is that acceptance of strict neutrality would
undermine decades of court precedents and open the floodgates to a
torrent of cases testing the limits of neutrality. The Suprene Court has
increasingly been using the language of neutrality (although not consistently) and many of its holdings are consistent with the principle.
Acceptance would not, for example, undermine the three-pronged test
for Establishment Clause cases, except that entanglement would need
to be refined. 19 One advantage, if the principle were accepted, would
be more consistently decided cases, a major dividend.
A fifth objection is that "similarly situated" is a vague term
fraught with potential conflict and abuse. Similar in what? How broad
must the category be? Who gets to decide? One model is nonprofit
organizations under the I.R.S. 501(c)3 category, which includes
charitable, literary, recreational, fraternal, scientific, social and educational groups. The neutrality principle is built on the realization that in
most legally significant dimensions religiously motivated individuals
and groups are similar to their secular counterparts. Unfortunately the
use of a strict neutrality principle will not do away with lawsuits, but
testing the contours of similarity is precisely what Courts do best.

The Values of Neutrality
Having attempted to spell out and counter the major objections to
strict neutrality, it may be appropriate to end with a brief list of the
perceived values of adoption of such a principle. They appear to be the
following:
1. The integration of free exercise and nonestablishment clauses
into a coherent, consistent, comprehensible principle which is faithful
to the intentions of the Founders, responsive to contemporary constitu-
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tional values of due process and equal protection, cognizant of current
political and economic realities, and defensible as a fair and equitable
rule of law.
2. Equal protection for nonreligious groups and individuals that
are similar to religious groups and individuals.
3. Establishment of a principled reason for bringing the secular
components of religious activities into conformity with the standards
and procedures required for other not-for-profit groups and activities.
4. A stimulus for religious groups which currently seek to influence government policy to undertake protection of rights for society
while they protect their own.
Whether the Courts will accept a neutrality principle depends in
large measure on whether it is understood, analyzed, critiqued,
developed and ultimately accepted or rejected by the intellectual community which deals with church-state issues. For that to happen the
principle must be given far more attention than it has yet received.
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